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THE N-PLAYER WAR OF ATTRITION IN THE LIMIT OF INFINITELY MANY
PLAYERS
PETER HELGESSON, BERNT WENNBERG
ABSTRACT. The War of Attrition is a classical game theoretic model that was first in-
troduced to mathematically describe certain non-violent animal behavior. The original
setup considers two participating players in a one-shot game competing for a given
prize by waiting. This model has later been extended to several different models al-
lowing more than two players. One of the first of these N -player generalizations was
due to J. Haigh and C. Cannings in [9] where two possible models are mainly dis-
cussed; one in which the game starts afresh with new strategies each time a player
leaves the game, and one where the players have to stick with the strategy they chose
initially. The first case is well understood whereas, for the second case, much is still
left open.
In this paper we study the asymptotic behavior of these two models as the number
of players tend to infinity and prove that their time evolution coincide in the limit. We
also prove new results concerning the second model in the N -player setup.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Game theory has ever since the pioneering works by J. von Neumann developed
in to an important tool in the study of various areas of research such as economical
science, computer science, political science, biology, social science and even in philos-
ophy. A common point of view is that game theory constitutes a theory of rational and
strategic decision making describing how rational players would optimize their play,
often in terms of Nash-equilibrium. During the years especially economical science
has earned a lot of success applying game theory in various situations, and this has
resulted in several Nobel-prizes. The latest of these was given to Alvin E. Roth and
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Loyd S. Shapley in 2012 "for the theory of stable allocations and the practice of mar-
ket design". However, when applying game theory to problems in biology and animal
behavior it is obvious that the common view point of having rational players is insuffi-
cient. Even though many situations in biology, in principle, could be described as some
kind of game, one can not consider animals as being actively rational. One rather ex-
pect animal behavior to be in agreement with game theory as a consequence of natural
selection in evolution. In 1973 in [12] J. Maynard Smith and G. R. Price introduced the
notion of Evolutionary Stable Strategy, in short ESS, that was to take the same place in
game theoretic biology as Nash-equilibrium had had in game theoretic economy. The
ESS serves as the natural candidate for what type of animal behavior that evolution
eventually would produce by natural selection. In 1974, published in [11], J. Maynard
Smith developed a game theoretic, non-violent, conflict scenario called War of Attri-
tion to describe potential animal behavior in e.g. territorial competition. The model
considers two players competing for one single prize V ∈ R+ by waiting. The cost of
waiting is modeled as proportional to the duration of the game, and it is payed in the
same amounts by both parts when the first player decides to leave. The remaining
player wins the game and collects the prize V . In [3] it was proven by D.T. Bishop
and C. Cannings that the war of attrition has one unique mixed ESS given by choosing
waiting time at random from an exponential probability distribution having mean V .
In 1999 John Maynard Smith, together with E. Mayr and G. C. Williams, was honored
with the Crafoord prize for his work in evolutionary biology in connection with game
theory.
In 1989 J. Haigh and C. Cannings in [9] generalized the two player model of the
war of attrition to models involving several players. One could of course think of many
ways of constructing such generalizations, but the ones considered in [9] are probably
the most natural extensions. In this text we will refer to these models as the dynamic
model and the static model1. The N -player dynamic model of the war of attrition is a
repetitive game in N − 1 rounds in which one player drops out of the game in each
round until there is only two players left in the final round. Between the rounds the
remaining players are allowed to change their strategies for the next round. The dy-
namic model is well understood and the existence and uniqueness of an ESS is proven
in [9] under very general conditions.
In the N -player static model of the war of attrition all participating players choose
their waiting time at the beginning of the game. Each of them are then bound to stick
to their chosen waiting time. Hence the static model is a one-shoot game, i.e. the out-
come of the game is known as soon as all players have made their choice. In contrast
to the dynamic model far less is know about how to play the static model. In [9] it is
proven by specific examples that the static model admit a unique ESS in some cases
while in other cases it does not, and much is left open.
The war of attrition has through time developed into one of the most classic game
theoretic models. It has been studied from a different interesting point of view in [7].
2. PRELIMINARIES AND INTRODUCTORY RESULTS
We begin with a heuristic discussion. For the simplest setup of the war of attrition,
from now on WA, (see [11]) we consider a two player game in which the contestants
are competing for a prize V > 0 by waiting. There is a cost connected to the duration
t of the game modelled linearly as −t. The game ends once one of the players decide
1In [9] the dynamic model is called Model C and the static model is called Model D.
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to withdraw by paying the collected time cost and leave the price V to the opponent
player, who also pays the time cost. If we name the players by x and y , and their
corresponding waiting times by τx and τy , we get the WA pay-off function for player
x as:
Jx(τx ,τy) :=

V − τy , if τx > τy
−τx , if τx < τy . (2.1)
In the case of equal waiting times we define
Jx(τ,τ) :=
V
2
−τ, ∀τ ∈ [0,∞). (2.2)
It is clear that this setup of the game can not have a pure strategy ESS, or even a pure
strategy Nash-equilibrium, since if there were such a strategy it would be given by a
fixed waiting time τ¯. It would therefore always be possible to brake this strategy by
waiting just a bit longer than τ¯. However, according to [3], there is a unique mixed
ESS given by letting τ ∼ exp(1/V ), i.e. letting τ be randomly distributed with an
exponential density of mean V . As mentioned in the introduction, in [9] J. Haigh and
C. Cannings generalized the above two player setup of the WA to two different models
allowing N players; one repetitive game, the dynamic model, and one one-shot game,
the static model. In both cases one consider a sequence

Vk
	N
k=1 of positive numbers
representing the prizes that the N players are competing for. In this text we will as-
sume this prize sequence to be an increasing sequence of real positive numbers, i.e.
0≤ V1 < V2 < ... < VN .
The dynamic N -player model is divided into N−1 distinct rounds. In the beginning
of the first round all the N players, independently of each other, choose their waiting
times. Then the players wait and the contestant having the least waiting time τ1
(1)
leaves the game by receiving the prize V1 and paying the time cost τ
1
(1)
. The remaining
N−1 players also pay the cost τ1
(1)
and proceed into the second round where the game
starts afresh and proceeds as in the first round, playing for the prize V2 instead. The
game goes on until the (N − 1)’th player leaves in the final round by receiving VN−1
and paying τN−1
(1)
, thus leaving the final player left to claim the prize VN for a total cost
of τ1
(1)
+ τ2
(1)
+ ...+ τN−1
(1)
.
It was proven in [9] that there exists a unique mixed ESS for each round k =
1,2, ...,N − 1 in the above dynamic model by choosing waiting time according to
an exponential distribution with mean (N − k)(Vk+1 − Vk). In what follows we will
use this result to investigate N -player limit of the dynamic model in a "sketchy man-
ner". Given the increasing sequence of prizes

Vk
	N
k=1 we associate a piecewise lin-
ear function, V N (x) on x ∈ [0,1], by declaring V N (0) := 0 and V N (k/N) := Vk so
that every pair

(k/N ,V N (k/N)), ((k+ 1)/N ,V N ((k+ 1)/N)
	
is joined together by
a line segment. It is clear that the function V N may have a very bad behaviour in
the limit as N −→ ∞. For instance if Vk := k we would get an a.e. unbounded
function in the limit. However, if we suppose that the prize sequence is such that
VN −→ V ∈ C 1([0,1]) as N −→ ∞ the dynamic N -player WA will have meaning in
the limit2 and we can investigate the limiting behaviour. If we denote the density func-
tion of the mixed ESS of round k by f N
k
, and let k = ⌈qN⌉ for some fixed q ∈ [0,1]
2Indeed, this can be accieved by starting from an increasing function g ∈ C 1([0,1]) and simply define
the sequence
 
Vk
N
k=1 as Vk := g(k/N).
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(⌈x⌉ := the smallest integer bigger than x), we have that
f N
k
(τ) :=
1
(N − k)

V

k+1
N

− V

k
N
exp
(
− τ
(N − k)

V

k+1
N

− V

k
N

)
=
1
(1− k
N
)

V

k+1
N

−V

k
N

1/N
exp


− τ
(1− k
N
)

V

k+1
N

−V

k
N

1/N



−→
−→ 1
(1− q)V ′(q) e
− τ
(1−q)V ′ (q) =: f (τ), (2.3)
as N −→∞. The number q represents the fraction of players that, at the moment, have
left the game. Of course, in this setup q depends on the time t ∈ R+ and we would
like to analyze its time evolution and how it relates to V (x). For this we introduce the
mean field density function m(t,τ) describing the fraction of players still left at time
t after the game has started, with chosen waiting times τ. Thus m will lose mass as
players are quitting according to∫ ∞
0
m(t,τ)dτ= 1− q(t), (2.4)
and since the τ-marginal should be exponentially distributed like (2.3) for every q we
get
m(t,τ) :=
1
V ′(q(t))
e
− τ
(1−q(t))V ′(q(t)) . (2.5)
Thinking of m(t, .) as an approximation of the distribution of players in the N -player
game at time t, let nt0 denote the number of players in the vicinity of τ = 0 at t (i.e.
having τ ∈ [0, dτ]). Then
m(t, 0)dτ≈
nt0
N
.
On the other hand, since t and τ are of the same time scale and m is continuous we
should also have that
m(t, 0)d t ≈
nt0
N
(2.6)
and therefore m(t, 0)dτ = m(t, 0)d t. This means that the number of players having
waiting times τ ∈ [0, dτ] equals to the number of players that will leave the game in
the interval [t, t + d t]. By this we get that
q(t) =
∫ t
0
m(s, 0)ds =
∫ t
0
1
V ′(q(s))
ds, (2.7)
which in turn yields a differential equation for the dynamics of q(t) as
d
d t
V (q(t)) = V ′(q(t))q˙(t) = 1. (2.8)
Since q(0) = 0, equation (2.8) suggests that
V (q(t))− V (0) = t (2.9)
and since the game by definition will end when all the players are out, i.e. when
q(t) = 1, we get by (2.9) that the total duration T of the game is given by the formula
T := V (1)− V (0). (2.10)
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In the following lemma we show that this result is consistent with the corresponding
result one would get from [9] in the limit of N .
Lemma 2.1. Let TN :=
∑N−1
k=1 E[τ
k
(1)
], where each τk
(1)
is a random variable with density
given by the first order statistics of (N−k+1) number of exponentially distributed random
variables with parameter (N − k)

V

k+1
N

− V

k
N

. Then
TN −→ V (1)− V (0) = T,
as N −→∞.
Proof. If X1, ...,XN ∼ exp(λ) and X(1) := min{X1, ...,XN } we have that E[X(1)] =
1/(λN). Thus, for the sequence (τk
(1)
)N−1
k=1
we have
E[τk
(1)] =
N − k
N − k+ 1

V

k+ 1
N

− V

k
N

so
TN =
N−1∑
k=1
N − k
N − k+ 1

V

k+ 1
N

− V

k
N

=
N−1∑
k=1
1− k
N
1− k
N
+ 1
N

V

k+ 1
N

− V

k
N

−→ V (1)− V (0)
as N −→∞, since the quotient (1− k/N)/(1− k/N − 1/N) −→ 1 independently of k,
and we end up with a telescopic sum. 
In the dynamic N -player WA the quantity TN is a natural measure of the expected
total time a typical game will last. In the first round all players chose their waiting
times according to an exponential distribution with mean (N − 1)(V2 − V1). If τ1i
denotes the waiting time of player i in the first round, we get a sequence of waiting
times τ11,τ
1
2, ...,τ
1
N
. The first round of the game will therefor last for a time τ1
(1)
:=
min(τ11,τ
1
2, ...,τ
1
N
), that is, the first order statistics of the waiting time sequence. In
this case, since τ11,τ
1
2, ...,τ
1
N
are i.i.d. and exponentially distributed, it is well known
that E[τ1
(1)
] = (N − 1)(V2 − V1)/N (see e.g. [5]). After the first round the game starts
afresh and the (N − 1) players (independently of the previous round) chose their new
waiting times τ21,τ
2
2, ...,τ
2
N−1 according to an exponential distribution, now having
mean (N − 2)(V3− V2). The expected time of round two is again derived by first order
statistics. The game continues like this until the (N − 1)’th player leaves and the final
prize VN is collected by the "winner". Thus the expected duration of the N -player game
is precisely given by TN . The result of Lemma 2.1 indicates consistency between the
heuristic arguments that led to (2.10) and [9].
Given an increasing C 1-prize function on the unit interval it is an easy task to solve
the ode in (2.8) and thereby derive the mean field density of players m(t,τ). Below we
have included some numerical results of m(t,τ) and q(t) for some different choices of
prize function.
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The results above concerning the time evolution of q are of course based on non rig-
orous arguments, but the main conclusion of q(t) being the inverse function of V (x)
makes sense from a game theoretic point of view. To be more precise; let t¯ ∈ [0, T] be
a fixed point of time representing any pure strategy in the limiting dynamic WA with
prize function V (x). If all players in the game are playing according to q(t) the payoff
of playing any pure strategy t¯ would be V (q( t¯))− t¯ = V (0) regardless of t¯. In other
words, q(t) represents a Nash-equilibrium in the limit of infinitely many players. In
the next section we investigate this more thoroughly.
3. CONVERGENCE IN THE N -PLAYER LIMIT OF THE DYNAMIC MODEL
In this section we consider the dynamic N -player generalization of the WA according
to [9] and its behaviour as the number of players grows to infinity. We will assume the
sequence {Vk}Nk=1 to be positive and strictly increasing and consider an (N − 1)-round
game (playing for Vk in the k’th round) in which each round starts afresh once a player
drops out. As stated in the introduction, we know that the dynamic model of the game
has a unique mixed ESS given by a certain exponential distribution in each round. We
assume that there is an increasing C 1-function defined on the unit interval, denoted
by V (x), such that V (0) = 0 and Vk := V (k/N).
Since the mixed strategy ESS is an exponential distribution we may consider the
evolution of the game as a continuous time Markov chain (X (t))t≥0, where X (t) counts
the total fraction of players that have decided to leave at t. Since a player that left
the game never returns X (t) will be a pure birth process. More specifically; if all the
players left in the game after the first k−1 rounds play according to the ESS the time it
takes to play the k’th round is given by the random variable Tk :=min(τ
k
1, ...,τ
k
N−k+1),
where τk1, ...,τ
k
N−k+1 are i.i.d. exponentially distributed with mean (N − k)(Vk+1− Vk).
Therefore
Tk ∼ exp

N − k+ 1
(N − k) Vk+1 − Vk

(3.1)
and if we let λk := (N − k + 1)/((N − k)
 
Vk+1 − Vk

), for k = 1, ...,N − 1, we have
the finite birth process below describing the time evolution of the game as players are
quitting:
0 λ1−→ 1 λ2−→ 2 λ3−→ ... λN−→ N (3.2)
We define λN := 0 since the game ends as soon as N−1 players has left. Now, consider
the stochastic jump process
X (t) =
N−1∑
k=1
1
N
I{T1+...+Tk≤t}. (3.3)
Then X (t) is a continuous time Markov process having the value k/N during the (k+
1)’th round of the game. We are interested in the limit limN→∞E[X (t)] and to prove
convergence towards q(t) (see 2.8). In order to find a closed form expression of the
expectation of X (t) we use standard methods from continuous time Markov chain
theory (see e.g. [1]). To the pure birth process in (3.3) we have the associated intensity
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matrix
Q :=

−λ1 λ1 0 · · · · · · 0
0 −λ2 λ2 0 · · · 0
...
...
...
. . .
. . .
...
0 0 0 · · · −λN−1 λN−1
0 0 0 0 · · · 0

. (3.4)
The Chapman-Kolomogorov equations state that¨
dP
dt
(t) = Q · P(t), t ≥ 0
P(0) = I ,
(3.5)
where P(t) =

pi j(t)

∈ RN×N is the matrix of transition probabilities from state i to
state j in (3.3), at time t. Henceforth, for the sake of simplicity, we will assume that
λ1 6= λ2 6= ... 6= λN . Allowing equalities would make the analysis much more involved,
but it would not contribute to any more interesting results. Solving (3.5) by hand
is tedious but straight forward, and it is possible to find a closed form expression of
the transition matrix P(t) (see Appendix A). The state probabilities pi(t) := P{X (t) =
(i − 1)/N}, collected in p(t) = (p1(t), ..., pN (t)), can be computed using the relation
p(t) = p(0) · P(t) together with the initial condition p(0) = (1,0, ..., 0). The result is
pi(t) =



e−λ1 t , if i = 1∑i
l=1
∏i−1
k=1 λk∏i
k=1,k 6=l(λk−λl)
· e−λl t , if 1< i ≤ N . (3.6)
Therefore
E[X (t)] =
N−1∑
i=0
i
N
· pi+1(t) =
N−1∑
i=1
i
N
i+1∑
l=1
∏i
k=1λk∏i+1
k=1,k 6=l
 
λk −λl
 · e−λl t . (3.7)
In order to proceed and to understand this complicated expression the following lemma
is useful:
Lemma 3.1. Let

λi
	n
i=1 be a sequence of positive and distinct real numbers. If fi(t) =
λie
−λi tχ[0,∞), then
f1 ∗ f2 ∗ ... ∗ fn(t) =
n∑
l=1
∏n
k=1λk∏n
k=1,k 6=l(λk − λl)
· e−λl t .
Proof. Consider the Laplace transform of the convolution:
L

f1 ∗ f2 ∗ ... ∗ fn(t)

(s) = fˆ1(s) · ... · fˆn(s) =
n∏
k=1
λk
s+ λk
, (3.8)
where fˆi(s) denotes the Laplace transform of fi(t). Splitting the above product into
partial fractions yields
Λ(s) :=
 
n∏
k=1
λk
! 
n∏
k=1
1
s+λk
!
=
 
n∏
k=1
λk
! 
n∑
k=1
Ak
s+λk
!
(3.9)
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and since all the λk are distinct by assumption we get that
lim
s→−λl
(s+λl)Λ(s) =
∏n
k=1 λk∏n
k=1,k 6=l (λk −λl)
. (3.10)
Thus, using the inverse transform to get back in to the time domain, we are done. 
We are now ready to state and prove a theorem concerning the convergence properties
of E[X (t)] as N −→∞.
Theorem 3.2. Let ǫ ∈ (0,1) and let V ∈ C 1[0,1] be the prize function defining the
Markov process X (t) in (3.3). Then, if we define
E1−ǫ[V (X (t))] :=
⌊(1−ǫ)N⌋∑
i=1
V

i
N
 i+1∑
l=1
∏i
k=1
λk∏i+1
k=1,k 6=l
 
λk −λl
 · e−λl t
and
Eǫ[V (X (t))] :=
N−1∑
i=⌈(1−ǫ)N⌉
V

i
N
 i+1∑
l=1
∏i
k=1 λk∏i+1
k=1,k 6=l
 
λk − λl
 · e−λl t ,
we have the following:
(1) limǫ→0 limN→∞E1−ǫ[V (X (t))] = t −H(t − V (1)) · t
(2) limǫ→0 limN→∞
Eǫ[V (X (t))]L1(dt) = 0, t ∈ [0,V (1))
(3) limN→∞ pN (t) = H(t − V (1))
with the limits taken in the stated order. Here H(x) is the Heaviside function.
Proof. We start by proving (1). Using the Laplace transform and the conclusion from
Lemma 3.1 we get that
L

E1−ǫ[V (X (t))]

(s) =
⌊(1−ǫ)N⌋∑
i=1
V

i
N

·L

1
λi+1
f1 ∗ ... ∗ fi+1(t)

(s) =
=
⌊(1−ǫ)N⌋∑
i=1
V

i
N

1
λi+1
· fˆ1 · ... · fˆi+1(s) =
=
⌊(1−ǫ)N⌋∑
i=1
V

i
N

1
λi+1
·
i+1∏
k=1
λk
s+ λk
,
which is well defined for all s ∈ C such that Re{s} > −mink λk. Now, investigate the
product in the above expression.
i+1∏
k=1
λk
s+ λk
= exp
 
i+1∑
k=1
ln
λk
s+λk
!
=
exp
 
i+1∑
k=1
ln
N − k+ 1
(N − k)(Vk+1 − Vk)
− ln

s+
N − k+ 1
(N − k)(Vk+1 − Vk)
!
=
exp
 
i+1∑
k=1
ln
1− k
N
+ 1
N
1− k
N

(Vk+1 − Vk)
− ln
s

1− k
N
 
Vk+1 − Vk

+ 1− k
N
+ 1
N
1− k
N

(Vk+1 − Vk)
!
=
exp
 
i+1∑
k=1
ln

1− k
N
+
1
N

− ln

s

1− k
N
 
Vk+1 − Vk

+

1− k
N
+
1
N
!
,
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where we take ln(.) to be the principal branch of the complex logarithm. Using that
ln(x + 1/N) = ln(x) + 1/(N x) + O (1/N2) for all x > 0 and that Vk+1 − Vk = V ′(ξ)/N
for some ξ ∈ (k/N , (k+ 1)/N) we get that
ln

1− k
N
+
1
N

− ln

s

1− k
N

(Vk+1 − Vk) +

1− k
N

+
1
N

=
−ln s(Vk+1 − Vk) + 1+ sV ′(ξ)
N2

1− k
N
 
s(Vk+1 − Vk) + 1
 +O  1
N2

=
−ln s(Vk+1 − Vk) + 1+O

1
N2

, (3.11)
where we have used that k ≤ ⌊(1− ǫ)N⌋ + 1 < N for N large enough, in the final
equality. Expression (3.11) is local and well defined for all s ∈ BrN (0), i.e. the disc
centered at the origin with radius rN := mink(Vk+1 − Vk)−1 ≈mink λk. By the equality
Vk+1 − Vk = (V ′(k/N) + O (1/N))/N and a Taylor expansion of ln(x + 1) about x = 0
we get for all s ∈ BrN (0) that
exp
 
−
i+1∑
k=1

ln(s(Vk+1 − Vk) + 1) +O

1
N2
!
=
exp
 
−
i+1∑
k=1

s
N

V ′

k
N

+O

1
N

+ s2O

1
N2

+ O

1
N2
!
=
exp
 
−
∫ (i+1)/N
1/N
s · V ′(x)d x + i
N

O

1
N

+ sO

1
N

+ s2O

1
N
!
=
exp

−s

V

i + 1
N

− V

1
N

+
i
N
·Φ

s,
1
N

,
where the ordo terms have been included in Φ. Thus,
L

E1−ǫ[V (X (t))]

(s) =
⌊(1−ǫ)N⌋∑
i=1
V

i
N

1
λi+1
· e−s

V

i+1
N

−V

1
N

+ i
N
·Φ

s, 1
N

=
⌊(1−ǫ)N⌋∑
i=1
V

i
N
 
V ′

i
N

+O

1
N

1+ O

1
N

N
· e−s

V

i+1
N

−V

1
N

+ i
N
·Φ

s, 1
N

=
∫ 1−ǫ
1/N
V (x)

V ′(x) + O

1
N

1+O

1
N

e−s(V (x)−V (1/N ))+
i
N
·Φ

s, 1
N

d x ,
and by considering the N -player limit of this expression we finally get (making the
change of variables du = V ′(x)d x using that V (x) is increasing) that
lim
N→∞
L

E1−ǫ[V (X (t))]

(s) =
∫ 1−ǫ
0
V (x)V ′(x)e−sV (x)d x =
∫ V (1−ǫ)
0
ue−sudu=
=
1
s2
−

V (1− ǫ)
s
+
1
s2

e−sV (1−ǫ),
which in turn yields
lim
ǫ→0
lim
N→∞
L

E1−ǫ[V (X (t))]

(s) =
1
s2
−

V (1− ǫ)
s
+
1
s2

e−sV .
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Since V (x) is bounded on a compact interval we can use Lebesgue’s theorem on dom-
inated convergence to interchange the order between the limits and the Laplace trans-
form and then, by the inversion formula, we get that
lim
ǫ→0
lim
N→∞
E1−ǫ[V (X (t))] = t −H(t − V (1)) · t
For proving (2) it will by assuming (3) suffice to consider the L1-norm of the sum from
⌈(1− ǫ)N⌉ to N − 2.

N−2∑
i=⌈(1−ǫ)N⌉
V

i
N

pi+1

=


N−2∑
i=⌈(1−ǫ)N⌉
V

i
N

· 1
λi+1

λ1e
−λ1 t ∗ ... ∗λi+1e−λi+1 t

 ≤
≤
N−2∑
i=⌈(1−ǫ)N⌉
V

i
N

· 1
λi+1
≤
N−2∑
i=⌈(1−ǫ)N⌉
V

i
N

· Vi+2 − Vi+1
1/N
· 1
N
=
=
N−2∑
i=⌈(1−ǫ)N⌉
V

i
N

V ′

i
N

+O

1
N

· 1
N
=
=
∫ 1
1−ǫ
V (x)

V ′(x) +O

1
N

d x + O

1
N

≤
≤ ǫ · sup
V (x)V ′(x)+ O  1
N

,
where we used the triangle inequality and the fact that the convolution is a probability
density in the second inequality. The statement in (2) follows immediately. Finally, for
proving the statement in (3) we analyse the limiting behavior of p′
N
(t). Note that
pN (t) =
N−1∑
l=1
∏N−1
k=1 λk∏N
k=1,k 6=l(λk − λl)
· e−λl t + 1.
By Lemma 3.1 we get
d
d t
pN (t) =
N−1∑
l=1
∏N−1
k=1 λk∏N−1
k=1,k 6=l(λk − λl)
· e−λl t =

λ1e
−λ1 t ∗ ... ∗λN−1e−λN−1 t

(t).
From the proof of (1) we know that
L

d
d t
pN (t)

=
N−1∏
k=1
λk
λk + s
= e−s

V

N−1
N

−V

1
N

+ N−1
N
·Φ

s, 1
N

,
and it follows that limN→∞ p
′
N
(t) = δV (1)(t). This proves (3) since pN (0) = 0 and
limt→∞ pN (t) = 1. 
Following the same line of reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 3.2 one can also prove
that limN→∞ Var(V (X (t))) := limN→∞(E[V (X (t))
2]−E[V (X (t))]2) = 0 on the interval
t ∈ [0,V (1)). We collect our results in a corollary.
Corollary 3.3. Let V (x) be an increasing C 1-function defined on the unit interval and
let X (t) be defined as in (3.3). Then
(i) limN→∞E[X (t)] = V
−1(t) := q(t), t ∈ [0,V (1))
(ii) limN→∞ Var(X (t)) = 0, t ∈ [0,V (1))
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Below we have included some numerical results illustrating the convergence of E[X (t)]
and Var(X (t)) for two different choices of V (x).
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FIGURE 1. Convergence of E[X (t)] and Var(X (t)) when V (x) = x2.
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FIGURE 2. Convergence of E[X (t)] and Var(X (t)) when V (x) =
p
x .
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The N -player limit in the dynamic generalization of the WA introduces some new fea-
tures in the game. In contrast to the case of having a finite number of players, in the
limit, there will be a continuous flow of players quitting the game. This flow depends
on the behavior of the mixed strategies that the players use to pick waiting times after
a certain fraction of the players have left at time t. It is natural to believe that the only
characteristic of the strategies that determines the flow of players is the behavior near
τ = 0. Since there are infinitely many players (all using the same strategy) there will
always be players having waiting times arbitrarily close to τ = 0. In what follows we
will analyse the connection between the out-flow of players and the characteristics of
the mixed strategies.
Suppose that { f α
i
}N
i=1 and { f
β
i
}N
i=1 are two different sequences of probability den-
sities in C 1(R+) such that f αi (0) = f
β
i
(0) 6= 0 for all i = 1, ...,N . We think of f α
i
or f
β
i
as different choices of strategies used in the i’th round of an N -player dy-
namic model WA. Let Ω represent both α and β and consider an independent sample
τΩ1 , ...,τ
Ω
N−i+1 ∼ f Ωi dτ. We define
TΩ
i
:=min

τΩ1 , ...,τ
Ω
N−i+1

. (3.12)
Note that
P
¦
TΩ
i
≤ x
©
= 1− P
¦
τΩ1 ≥ x , ...,τΩN−i+1 ≥ x
©
=
= 1−
N−i+1∏
k=1
P
¦
τΩ
k
≥ x
©
= 1−

1− FΩ
i
(x)
N−i+1
,
where FΩ
i
is the cdf associated to the density function f Ω
i
, i.e. FΩ
i
(x) := P
¦
τΩ
k
≤ x
©
.
Thus, the density function of TΩ
i
is given by
f Ω
(i)
(τ) = (N − i + 1) f Ω
i
(τ)

1− FΩ
i
(τ)
N−i
. (3.13)
Note that
lim
N→∞
∫ ∞
0
f Ω
(i)
(τ) ·ϕ(τ)dτ= ϕ(0) + lim
N→∞
∫ ∞
0
f Ω
(i)
(τ)(ϕ(τ)−ϕ(0))dτ= ϕ(0) (3.14)
for any test function ϕ ∈ C∞0 (R), so limN→∞ f Ω(i)dτ = δ0. Finally we also define the
sum
SΩ
q
:=
⌊qN⌋∑
i=1
TΩ
i
, q ∈ (0,1]. (3.15)
Now, let δ > 0 and consider the probability
P
§Sαq − Sβq ≥ δ
ª
≤ 1
δ2
E

Sα
q
− Sβ
q
2
=
=
1
δ2

E

Sα
q
2
+E

Sβ
q
2
− 2E
h
Sα
q
i
E
h
Sβ
q
i
= (3.16)
=
1
δ2

Var

Sα
q

+Var

Sβ
q

+E
h
Sα
q
i2
+E
h
Sβ
q
i2
− 2E
h
Sα
q
i
E
h
Sβ
q
i
,
where we used the Chebyshev-Markov inequality in the first step. Our goal is to prove
that the right most expression in the inequality above, under reasonable assumptions
on the functions
¦
f Ω
i
©N
i=1
, tend point wise to zero as N tends to infinity. If the random
sums SΩ
q
are converging a.s.-dP then, in the limit, the variances vanish and the problem
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would reduce to proving that limN→∞E
h
Sα
q
− Sβ
q
i
= 0 for all q ∈ [0,1). We start by
investigating the convergence of the sums. According to [6] (theorem 8.3, pp. 62) it
is sufficient to prove that
∑∞
i=1 Var(T
Ω
i
) <∞ in order to get almost sure convergence
in SΩ
q
. This property is proven in the following lemma:
Lemma 3.4. Assume that
¦
f Ω
i
©N
i=1
⊂ C 1(R+) is uniformly bounded from above by some
positive constant C, independent of N, and that the f Ω
i
(τ) decay at least like o(1/τp),
with p > 3. Then
∑∞
i=1
Var(TΩ
i
)<∞.
Proof. By partial integration and using the fact that f Ω
i
(τ) = o

1/τ3

, we have
E
h
TΩ
i
2i
=
∫ ∞
0
τ2 · (N − i + 1) f Ω
i
(τ)

1− FΩ
i
(τ)
N−i
dτ=
= 2
∫ ∞
0
τ ·

1− FΩ
i
(τ)
N−i+1
dτ=
= 2
∫ ∆
0
τ ·

1− FΩ
i
(τ)
N−i+1
dτ+ 2
∫ ∞
∆
τ ·

1− FΩ
i
(τ)
N−i+1
dτ,
where ∆ is an arbitrary positive number. Because of (3.14) it is clear that the second
moment of TΩ
i
tends to zero as N grows and the result can be established by proving
that this convergence is sufficiently fast. We investigate the rate of convergence for
both of the integrals above. Let τ¯= argmax[0,∆]{τ ·

1− FΩ
i
(τ)
N−i+1}. Then∫ ∆
0
τ ·

1− FΩ
i
(τ)
N−i+1
dτ≤ τ¯

1− FΩ
i
(τ¯)
N−i+1 ·∆≤∆2e(N−i+1)ln(1−FΩi (τ¯)),
and we get exponential convergence near the origin since τ¯ > 0 and hence also
FΩ
i
(τ¯)) > 0 since f Ω
i
(0) > 0 by assumption. For the other part, let k ∈ N be the least
integer so that the integral of the function τ ·

1− FΩ
i
(τ)
k
converges at infinity. By
the asymptotic assumption on f Ω
i
(τ) an easy calculation shows that k = 1. Therefore∫ ∞
∆
τ ·

1− FΩ
i
(τ)
N−i+1
dτ≤

1− FΩ
i
(∆)
N−i ∫ ∞
∆
τ ·

1− FΩ
i
(τ)

dτ≤
≤∆2e(N−i)ln(1−FΩi (∆)),
and once again we get exponential convergence. Thus, because of the uniform bound
of
¦
f Ω
i
©N
i=1
, we are done. 
Next we consider the limiting properties of the expectation E
h
Sα
q
− Sβ
q
i
. Note that
E
h
Sα
q
− Sβ
q
i
=
⌊qN⌋∑
i=1
E
h
Tα
i
− Tβ
i
i
.
As with the variances in the previous lemma we are interested in the rate of conver-
gence to zero of E
h
Tα
i
− Tβ
i
i
as N tends to infinity. We summarize the results in a
lemma:
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Lemma 3.5. Assume that
¦
f Ω
i
©N
i=1
⊂ C 1(R+) is uniformly bounded from above by some
positive constant C, independent of N, and that the f Ω
i
(τ) decay at least like o(1/τp),
with p > 1, when τ→∞. Then limN→∞E
h
Sα
q
− Sβ
q
i
= 0.
The proof of this lemma goes exactly like the proof of Lemma 3.4. Now, using the
Chebyshev estimate in (3.17) together with the results in Lemma 3.4 and 3.5 we have
reached the following conclusion:
Theorem 3.6. Let
¦
f Ω
i
©N
i=1
⊂ C 1(R+) be uniformly bounded from above by some positive
constant C, independent of N, and assume that f Ω
i
(τ) decay at least like o(1/τp), with
p > 3. Then
lim
N→∞
P
§Sαq − Sβq  ≥ δ
ª
= 0
for all δ > 0 and all q ∈ (0,1].
The intuitive meaning of Theorem 3.6 is that the time evolution of an N -player dy-
namic model WA with a large N is completely determined by the initial values of the
mixed strategies that are being used. In terms of the mean field density m(t,τ) from
the introduction this means the t-marginal m(t, 0). Thus, in the N -player limit the
τ-dependence, for τ > 0, gets superfluous and it suffices to choose a strategy in t.
In a sense this makes the dynamic model look like a static model since it is enough
for each player to decide upon "how to quit". In [9], the static model is the N -player
version of the WA differing from the dynamic model in that the remaining players are
not allowed to reconsider their waiting times as other players drop out. This model
has not yet been thoroughly investigated and the analysis done so far in the N -player
case neither give explicit results, nor does it give any concrete answers for when and
if there exist evolutionary stable strategies. Due to Theorem 3.6 there might be reason
to believe that the two models coincide in the N -player limit. In what follows we will
investigate this connection in order to find more definite results for the static model.
4. CONVERGENCE IN THE STATIC MODEL
In the static model of the N -player WA the players begin by choosing their waiting
times for the upcoming game. Once the game has started the participants are not
allowed to reappraise their bids and (after a reordering of the players) we get an
increasing sequence of waiting times t1, t2, ..., tN . The prizes {Vk}Nk=1 ⊂ R+ are handed
out to each player according to this order, i.e. the player with the least waiting time
receives V1 and pays t1, the player with the second least receives V2 and pays t2, and so
forth until the last player who receives VN and pays tN−1. Thus, the game ends once the
second last player quits. In contrast to the dynamic model, which was a repeated game,
the static model of WA is a one-shot game. We are interested in finding a probability
density gN (t) being a mixed strategy ESS in this N -player model. In particular, since
every ESS also is a Nash-equilibrium, such a strategy must have the property that if
one player chooses to play a pure strategy δx , x ∈ R+, and the rest of the players are
playing according to gN (t), the expected payoff of playing the pure strategy must be
constant regardless of the value of x . For the expected payoff we adopt the following
notation:
Definition 4.1. Let {µk}Nk=1 be a sequence of probability measures on R+ representing
a choice of mixed strategies by the players in an N -player static model WA and let
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µ−i := {µk}Nk=1,k 6=i for all i = 1, ...,N . The expected payoff to player i when playing µi
against µ−i is denotedJN (µi |µ−i) = JN (µi |µ1, ...,µi−1,µi+1, ...,µN ). If a given number
r, 2 ≤ r ≤ N − 1, of the measures in µ−i are equal to the same measure µ we write
(µ, ...,µ) = µ⊕r3.
Playing δx in a population where all opponents play gN (t), and GN (t) is the cdf of
gN (t), we have that
JN

δx |g⊕(N−1)N

=
N−2∑
r=0
 
Vr+1 − x
N − 1
r

GN (x)
r
 
1− GN (x)
N−r
+
+
∫ x
0
 
VN − y

d

GN (y)
N−1 . (4.1)
If we require that d/d x
h
JN

δx |g⊕(N−1)N
i
= 0 we end up with the necessary condi-
tion for GN to be an ESS:


dGN
dx
=
1−GN−1N
(N−1)
∑N−2
r=0 cr(
N−2
r )G
r
N(1−GN)
N−2−r =: ΞN (GN )
GN (0) = 0,
(4.2)
where cr :=
 
Vr+2 − Vr+1

. As in the previous section we will from now on assume the
prize sequence {Vk}Nk=1 to be positive and strictly increasing. This means that cr > 0
for all r = 0, ...,N − 2 and hence the function ΞN (ξ) is well defined, positive and
continuous for all 0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1. We also note that ΞN (1) = 0 and Ξ′N (1) < 0, i.e. (4.2)
is asymptotically stable in ξ = 1, and since dGN/d x(0) > 0 we get by basic properties
of autonomous equations (see e.g. [13]) that the unique solution to (4.2), given any
increasing prize sequence, is the cdf of some probability density function gN (t). In the
following proposition we prove that the limiting solution of the static model coincides
with the limiting solution of the dynamic model.
Proposition 4.2. Let V (x) be an increasing C 1-function on the unit interval such that
V (0) = 0 and define the sequence

Vk
	N
k=1 by Vk := V (k/N). Then, if GN is the unique
solution of problem (4.2) with the given prize sequence, it holds that
GN (t)−→

V−1 (t) , 0≤ t ≤ V (1)
1, t > V (1)
uniformly as N →∞.
Proof. The key idea to prove this proposition is to consider the limiting equation of
(4.2) as N → ∞. For this we use a theorem by Bernstein (see e.g. [10]) saying that
if f : [0,1]→ R is a bounded continuous function and pnν(x), ν = 0, ...,n, is the ν ’th
Bernstein polynomial of degree n then
lim
n→∞
n∑
ν=0
f
ν
n

pnν (x) = f (x),
and the relation holds uniformly on [0,1]. Thus, considering the denominator in (4.2)
as a function on [0,1], replacing GN by a fixed x , we get uniform convergence to V
′
3In this text the measures in {µk}Nk=1 will often be given by a density function ϕk(t), i.e. µk = ϕk(t)d t,
and we will in those cases abuse the notation in Definition 4.1 by identifying µk with ϕk .
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since (N − 1)cr = V ′(r/N) + O (1/N). Consequently
lim
N→∞
ΞN (x) =
1
V ′(x)
,
uniformly on the interval [0,1). We therefore have the limit equation y ′ = 1/V ′(y)
satisfying the initial value y(0) = 0, which admits the unique solution y(x) = V−1(x)
on [0,V (1)]. Let yN be the unique solution to (4.2) restricted to the interval [0,V (1)]
and consider the absolute value of the difference:
|yN (x)− y(x)|=

∫ x
0
ΞN (yN (t))−
1
V ′(y(t))
d t

≤
∫ x
0
ΞN (yN (t))−ΞN (y(t))d t +
∫ x
0
ΞN (y(t))− 1V ′(y(t))
 d t
≤ CN
∫ x
0
yN (t)− y(t)d t + ǫN x ,
where CN is a Lipschitz constant (uniformly bounded over N) of ΞN and limN→∞ ǫN = 0
by the uniform convergence of ΞN . Thus, by a Grönwall estimate we get the point wise
upper bound
|yN (x)− y(x)| ≤ ǫN xexCN , x ∈ [0,V (1)] (4.3)
and hence point wise convergence of yN in this interval. Point wise convergence on a
compact interval does not in general imply uniform convergence, but since {yN }∞N=2 is
a sequence of monotone functions that converge point wise to a continuous function
we have by a theorem in [4] in this case even uniform convergence. For the rest of the
half axis, i.e. x ∈ (V (1),∞), we have uniform convergence towards 1 by monotonicity
and the fact that y(V (1)) = V−1(V (1)) = 1. This finally proves the theorem. 
Proposition 4.2 proves that the limiting properties of the static and the dynamic models
coincide. In the N -player limit of the static model we have concluded that, given an
increasing prize function V (x) an ESS, if it exists, must be the strategy of choosing
a waiting time according to the probability density q˙(t). On the other hand, we also
know that the same strategy is reached as the limit of ESS strategies in the dynamic
N -player model. Therefore, since Theorem 3.6 suggests that the dynamic model is
indistinguishable from the static model in the N -player limit, one might have hope for
the strategy q˙(t) to be an ESS even in the static model. A more thorough analysis of
the limiting strategy, carried out in Section 5, shows that this is false. The results will
nevertheless give hints on how to proceed with the N -player static model.
Another notable result from this section is that the candidate ESS-solution gN (t)
has support in all of R+ (due to asymptotic stability) despite the fact that the prizes
are bounded from above by VN . This property might feel somewhat unnatural since
the mass of gN (t) in (VN ,∞) would contribute negatively to the expected payoff. This
is not the case, however, since the last player quitting is paying the time cost of the
second last player. The tail of gN (t) is important for the strategy to be an ESS, and
even to be a Nash-equilibrium. Indeed, if we consider an N -player game of the static
WA in which all players use a strategy ϕ(t)d t such that ϕ ∈ C [0,VN ] one could choose
to play δVN which would have an expected payoff strictly larger than that of playing
ϕ(t)d t. A good way to think of the asymptotic behaviour of gN (t) (for large values
of t) is that the mass in (VN ,∞) should be small enough for the probability of having
more that one out of N trails in this interval to be negligibly small. Hence if an unlucky
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player receives a waiting time much larger than VN he will most likely be "saved" by
the second last player. By this one would expect the tail to become lighter and lighter
as the number of players increase since the probability of getting several players in
(VN ,∞) otherwise would increase. This property is partly supported by the conclusion
of Proposition 4.2 saying that the limit strategy is confined to the interval [0,VN ].
5. PROPERTIES OF THE LIMIT STRATEGY AND THE N -PLAYER STATIC MODEL
In this section we investigate the game theoretic properties of the limiting strategy
q˙(t). In particular we are interested in knowing wether this strategy represents an
ESS or not. The first problem one encounters when initiating this analysis is that the
definition of a mixed strategy ESS does not make sense in the N -player limit since a
finite number of invading players do not affect an infinite population. In order to give
a more suitable definition we consult the abstract, but still standard, measure theoretic
approach to games and game theory. Such an approach is given e.g. by Balder [2],
and goes as follows:
Let P = (P,P ,µ) be a finite measure space such that, for convenience, µ(P) = 1.
Each p ∈ P can be thought of as a player and hence P is the space of players. Let
A be a metric space of actions, or pure strategies, available to the players in P4, let
B(A) be the Borel σ-algebra, and consider the pair A = (A,B(A)). The set of all
probability measures on A is denoted by M1(A). A mixed (action) profile is a Young
measure ∆ : P →M1(A) such that for µ-a.e. p it holds that ∆(p)(A) = 1. Recall that
for ∆ to be a Young measure we require the map p 7→ ∆(p)(B) to be P -measurable
for all fixed B ∈ B(A) . The set of all such ∆’s is denoted R . Intuitively a given
∆ ∈ R contains information of what mixed strategies the players in P have chosen.
If f is a measurable selection of the multifunction Σ : p 7→ A and we choose ε f ∈ R
so that ε f (p) := δ f (p) (Dirac measure at f (p)) we see that the pure action profiles are
contained in R . Finally we define the payoff function connected to player p ∈ P as a
function Jp : P ×R → [−∞,∞). Thus, Jp(p|∆) measures the benefits (or losses) of
player p when the population is playing ∆ ∈R . For our purpose it suffices to consider
games in which all players in P share the same explicit form of the payoff function
so that Jp(p|.) = J (p|.) for all p ∈ P. In this setting we define a game as a triplet
G= (P,A,J ).
Given a mixed action profile ∆ ∈ R and a player p ∈ P it is natural to think of ∆
as being made up of two parts. One "internal" part representing the strategy chosen by
player p (namely ∆(p)) and one "external" part for the strategies of the opponents of
p. In many game theoretic models (see [2]) the internal and external parts of ∆ are
reflected in an explicit form of the payoff function called internal-external form. For
this we need (i) a space Y that we call the space of profile statistics of the game, (ii) a
utility function U : A× Y → [−∞,∞) and (iii) a mapping e :R → Y , called the mixed
externality, such that J can be written as:
J (p|∆) =
∫
A
U (x , e(∆))∆(p)(d x), p ∈ P
With the abstract framework at hand we can now extend Balder’s ideas to give a mea-
sure theoretical notion of an ESS. Before doing so we recall the definition of the N -
player ESS according to Palm [14].
4In [2] the setting is even more general with each player p ∈ P having access to some action set Ap ∈
B(A).
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Definition 5.1. A probability measure π∗ is said to be an evolutionary stable strategy, or
ESS, if either
(i) JN

π∗|π⊕(N−1)∗

> JN

ϕ|π⊕(N−1)∗

for any other probability measure ϕ 6= π∗, or else, if there is a ϕ¯ such that equality
holds in (i), then
(ii) JN

π∗|π⊕(N−2)∗ , ϕ¯

> JN

ϕ¯|π⊕(N−2)∗ , ϕ¯

.
For a continuum of players we extend the above definition to the following:
Definition 5.2. Let G = (P,A,J ) be a game admitting a decomposition of J to
internal-external form with space of profile statistics Y , utility function U and mixed
externality e. Let ǫ > 0 and pick a Borel set Pǫ ∈ P such that 0< µ(Pǫ)≤ ǫ and define
the mixed action profile
Π
Pǫ
(π,ϕ)
(p) :=

π, if p ∈ P\Pǫ
ϕ, if p ∈ Pǫ (5.1)
where π,ϕ ∈M1(A). We say that π∗ ∈M1(A) is an ESS of G if either of the following
holds for all ǫ small enough and independently of Pǫ:
(i)
∫
A
U (x , e(ΠPǫ
(π∗,ϕ)
))π∗(d x)>
∫
A
U (x , e(ΠPǫ
(π∗,ϕ)
))ϕ(d x),
for any ϕ ∈ M+1 (A)\{π∗} and all p ∈ P\Pǫ , or else, if there is a ϕ¯ ∈M1(A)\{π∗} such
that equality holds in (i), then
(ii)
∫
A
U (x , e(ΠPǫ
(ϕ¯,π∗)
))π∗(d x)>
∫
A
U (x , e(ΠPǫ
(ϕ¯,π∗)
))ϕ¯(d x).
for all p ∈ Pǫ .
The intuition of the above definition is the same as in the N -player case, namely that;
playing the strategy π in a population where all but a small ǫ-fraction plays some other
strategy ϕ should be strictly superior and else, if equally good, playing π should do
better even if an (1− ǫ)-fraction of the population plays ϕ. Using the terminology
of adaptive dynamics, the strategy π can invade other populations, but can never be
invaded itself.
Turning back to the static limit model of the war of attrition, we will now fit it into
the abstract framework above. For for a continuum of identical players it is suitable to
considerP = ([0,1],B([0,1]),m)where m is the Lebesgue measure. Since all players
chose a positive waiting time the action space is A = (R+,B(R+)), with the usual
euclidian metric. For the payoff function of a static WA with a continuum of players
and increasing prize function V ∈ C 2[0,1] things turn out simplified compared to the
finite model (see [9], pp. 69). We restrict ourselves to consider mixed strategies in
M 01 (R+) ⊂ M1(R+), where M 01 (R+) is the set of probability measures on R+ such
that dP(t) = π˙(t)d t and π˙(t) ∈ C (R+). Consider a finite partition Z = {Zǫi }ni=1 of
[0,1] for which m(Zǫi ) = ǫi . LetA (Z ) = {πi(t)d t}ni=1 ⊂M 01 (R+) and assume that all
players in Zǫi are playing πi(t)d t for all i = 1, ...,n. If∆A (Z ) : [0,1]→M 01 (R+) is the
mixed action profile corresponding to the pair (Z ,A (Z )) we introduce the average of
∆A (Z ) as the measure
∆¯A (Z )(d t) :=
∫ 1
0
∆A (Z )(p)dp =
N∑
i=1
ǫiπi(t)d t.
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Note that in an N -player game constructed so that P = {1/N , 2/N , ..., 1}, P = 2P
and µ({i/N}) = 1/N , for i = 1,2, ...,N , and in which we consider a mixed action
profile∆(i/N) = πi ∈M 01 (R+), the average of∆ is nothing but the mixed distribution
(
∑N
i=1πi)/N . Now, considering the behaviour of V (t) as players are leaving in the
static WA with infinitely many players it is by continuity clear that a single player
quitting will not contribute the time evolution. For V to evolve at some point of time
t, i.e. have V ′(t) > 0, requires a positive density of players quitting at t. Since V
is differentiable by assumption all the players quitting at t will collect the same prize
V (t)− t and therefore the dependence of order among players locally vanishes in the
limit. We conclude that, given some partition Z and a corresponding set of mixed
strategiesA (Z ), the payoff function of the static model WA in the continuum limit of
infinitely many players can be written on interior-exterior form as
J

p|∆A (Z )

:=
∫ ∞
0

V
∫ t
0
∆¯A (Z )(d x)

− t

∆(p)(d t). (5.2)
Thus, in this case the space of profile statistics is given by the space of cdf’s, i.e. Y =
{ f : f (t) =
∫ t
0
ν(d x) for all t ∈ R+ and some ν ∈M1(R+)}, and the mixed externality
is given by the map e :∆A (Z ) 7→
∫ t
0
∆¯A (Z )(d x).
We are now ready to start the ESS-analysis of playing q˙(t) in the static limit model
of the WA. Considering condition (i) in Definition 5.2 with the mixed action profile
Π
Pǫ
(q˙,ϕ˙)
, hence the mixed externality e

Π
Pǫ
(q˙,ϕ˙)

= ǫϕ + (1 − ǫ)q, and using a Taylor
expansion followed a partial integration we get that∫ ∞
0
U (t, e(Πǫ
(q˙,ϕ˙)))q˙(t)d t −
∫ ∞
0
U (t, e(Πǫ
(q˙,ϕ˙)))ϕ˙(t)d t =∫ ∞
0
 
q˙− ϕ˙V  ǫϕ+ (1− ǫ)q− t d t =
∫ ∞
0
 
q˙− ϕ˙V (q) + V ′(q) ǫϕ− ǫq− t d t + O ǫ2=
ǫ
∫ ∞
0
 
q˙− ϕ˙V ′(q) ϕ− q d t + O ǫ2=
−ǫ
2
∫ ∞
0
d
d t
 
ϕ− q2 · V ′(q)d t +O ǫ2=
ǫ
2
∫ ∞
0
 
ϕ− q2 q˙V ′′(q)d t + O ǫ2 , (5.3)
where we have used that V (q(t))− t = 0 in the third equality. Now, choosing ǫ small
enough, so that the ordo term can be neglected, we reach the conclusion that wether
the first condition in Definition 5.2 is fulfilled or not is depends on the geometry of
the graph of V (x). Since q˙(t) is a probability density, and by that positive, what deter-
mines the sign of the difference in payoff is the second derivative of the prize function.
If V (x) is convex the strategy of choosing waiting time according to q˙(t)d t will always
constitute an ESS whereas, if instead V (x) is a concave function, the q˙-strategy can be
invaded by any other strategy inM 01 (R+). For a linear model in which V (x) = kx for
some k > 0, it follows by an easy calculation that there is equality in both (i) and (ii)
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in Definition 5.2. If V (x) is neither convex nor concave the strategy q˙(t)d t is not an
ESS since (5.3) could be made both positive and negative by choosing ϕ˙(t) carefully.
In particular, if A− := {t : V ′′(q(t)) < 0} and A+ := R+\A−, choosing ϕ˙ so that ϕ ≡ q
on A+ and (ϕ(t)− q(t))2 > 0 on a subset of A− of positive Lebesgue measure yields a
negative value in (5.3).
According to [9], in the static N -player model, a sufficient (second order varia-
tional) condition for a cdf GN (t), solving (4.2), to be an ESS is to have positivity in the
functional
ΥN [α] :=
∫ ∞
0
Q

GN

(t) ·α2(t)d t (5.4)
for all functions α(t), i.e. Q

GN

(t)> 0 , where
Q

GN

= 2GN−2
N
+
d
d t
(
N−2∑
r=0
cr

N − 2
r

G r
N
(1− GN )N−2−r
)
(5.5)
for all t ≥ 0. In the case of a linear model, in which the sequence Vk	Nk=1 is an increas-
ing arithmetic progression, positivity is proven in [9]. For more general sequences the
problem is left open. However, the conclusions we made from the calculations in (5.3)
suggest that the positivity of Q might also be true for large N when the prize sequence
is convex, i.e. so that the sequence of consecutive differences

cr
	N−2
r=0 is increasing.
The next theorem implies that this is true, not only asymptotically, but for all N ≥ 2.
Theorem 5.3. Let

Vk
	N
k=1 ⊂ R+ be an increasing sequence such that the sequence of
consecutive differences

cr
	N−2
r=0 is non-decreasing. Then, if GN (t) is the cdf solving (4.2),
it holds that Q

GN

(t) ≥ 0 for all t ≥ 0 and any N ≥ 2. On the other hand, if cr	N−2r=0
is decreasing, then Q

GN

(t) takes negative values in a set of positive Lebesgue-measure.
Finally, limt→∞Q

GN

(t) = 1 independently of the sequence of consecutive differences.
Proof. Consider the second term in the definition of Q

GN

:
d
d t
(
N−2∑
r=0
cr

N − 2
r

G r
N
(1− GN )N−2−r
)
=
= gN (N − 2)

cN−2G
N−3
N
− c0
 
1− GN
N−3
+
N−3∑
r=1
gN cr

N − 2
r

rG r−1
N
 
1− GN
N−2−r − (N − 2− r)G r
N
 
1− GN
N−3−r
=
N−3∑
r=0
gNG
r
N
 
1− GN
N−3−r 
cr+1

N − 2
r + 1

(r + 1)− cr

N − 2
r

(N − 2− r)

.
Each term in the sum above is positive if and only if
cr
cr+1
≤
 N−2
r+1

(r + 1) N−2
r

(N − 2− r)
= 1, (5.6)
and since

cr
	N−2
r=0 is a growing sequence by assumption we get that Q

GN

is positive
for all t ≥ 0 and all N ≥ 2.
If

cr
	N−3
r=0 is decreasing we have especially that c0/c1 > 1 and the condition in (5.6)
is broken for this pair. It is then easy to check that Q

GN

(0) < 0 and, because of
continuity, it is therefore also negative in some neighborhood of t = 0.
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The last claim in the theorem follows easily from the definition of Q, using the
explicit formula above for the term with derivative, and that limt→∞ GN (t) = 1 and
limt→∞ gN (t) = 0. 
Thus, by Theorem 5.3 we get the important corollary:
Corollary 5.4. Let

Vk
	N
k=1 be a positive and increasing sequence of numbers such that
the differences cr = Vr+2 − Vr+1 forms a positive and increasing sequence. Further, let
GN be the unique cdf solving the problem in (4.2) and let gN (t) := dGN/d t(t). Then,
choosing a waiting time according to the probability density gN (t) in an N-player static
model of war of attrition, with the prize sequence

Vk
	N
k=1, is a unique ESS.
The conclusion of Corollary 5.4 is indeed more than what one could have hoped for
since the calculation leading to (5.3) is representative only for a static model WA with
a very large number of players.
Now, switching focus towards concave prize sequences, i.e. sequences such that
cr
	N−2
r=0 is positive and decreasing, things turn out to be a bit more complicated. By
Theorem 5.3 the functional in (5.4) can take both positive and negative values, making
it a useless tool for ESS analysis5. On the other hand, (5.3) indicates that any strategy,
when used by a few players, does better against gN (t) when N is large. In order to
investigate this problem closer we consider the problem of playing an N -player static
model WA in which one opponent is playing δ0, i.e. the pure strategy of quitting at
t = 0, and where the rest N−2 opponents play gN (t). If the expected payoff of quitting
immediately is greater than the expected payoff of playing gN (t) the latter is not an
ESS. Here it is important to consider a situation in which at least one of the N − 1
opponents play a strategy different from gN (t) since if not, recalling that gN (t) solves
(4.2), the expected payoff of playing any other strategy would be zero. According
to [9] the expected payoff of playing gN (t) against one δ0-player and N − 2 other
gN -players is given by the expression
JN

gN |g⊕(N−2)N ,δ0

=∫ ∞
0
gN (t)

N−2∑
r=0
 
Vr+2 − t
N − 2
r

G r
N
(t)(1− GN (t))N−2−r +
∫ t
0
GN−2
N
(x)d x

 d t
=
∫ ∞
0
gN (t)
N−2∑
r=0
Vr+2

N − 2
r

G r
N
(t)(1− GN (t))N−2−rd t−
−
∫ ∞
0
 
1− GN (t)

1− GN (t)N−2

d t, (5.7)
where we used partial integration and that
∫ t
0
GN−2
N
(x)d x− t =
∫ t
0

GN−2
N
(x)− 1

d x .
If instead of playing gN (t) we were to play δ0, still facing the same opponents, the
expected payoff is
JN

δ0|g⊕(N−2)N ,δ0

=
V1 + V2
2
.
5In [9], for an N -player static model WA, being the N ’th player, the functional ΥN represents the second
order condition of the variational problem of finding the extremum of the difference in payoff between
playing the strategy gN (t) compared to any other strategy h(t). Specifically, one considers the case of facing
one player using h(t) and the rest using gN (t).
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We denote the difference between these two numbers by∆
δ0
N . Corollary 5.4 guarantees
that ∆
δ0
N > 0 for all N ≥ 3 as long as the given prize sequence is convex. By (5.3) it is
natural to investigate to what extent the opposite holds true in the concave case. We
start by analyzing the first term in (5.7), assuming that N ≥ 4. By partial integration
twice, using the derivative formula from the proof of Theorem 5.3, one finds that∫ ∞
0
gN
N−2∑
r=0
Vr+2

N − 2
r

G r
N
(1− GN )N−2−rd t
= VN −
N − 2
2
 
VN − VN−1

+∫ ∞
0
gN
G2
N
2
N−4∑
r=0
G r
N
(1− GN )N−4−r

N − 4
r

(N − 3)(N − 2)(cr+2 − cr+1)d t.
Expanding the binomial in the expression above, using the binomial theorem, the in-
tegral becomes explicitly solvable and one finds that∫ ∞
0
gN
N−2∑
r=0
Vr+2

N − 2
r

G r
N
(1− GN )N−2−rd t
= VN −
N − 2
2
 
VN − VN−1

+
+
(N − 2)(N − 3)
2
N−4∑
r=0
(cr+2 − cr+1)

N − 4
r
 N−4−r∑
k=0

N − 4− r
k

(−1)k
3+ r + k
.
Now, from [8] we have the relation
q∑
k=0

q
k

(−1)k
k− p =
q!Γ(−p)
Γ(q+ 1− p) , (5.8)
for any p ∈ R\{0,1,2, ...} and any positive integer q. Using (5.8) for simplifying the
inner sum above we end up with the expression
∆
δ0
N = VN −
N − 2
2
 
VN − VN−1

+
N−4∑
r=0
(r + 1)(r + 2)
2(N − 1)
 
cr+2 − cr+1
−
−
∫ ∞
0
 
1− GN

1− GN−2
N

d t − V1 + V2
2
=

VN − N − 2
2
 
VN − VN−1

+
N−4∑
r=0
r2
2(N − 1)
 
cr+2 − cr+1
−
−
∫ ∞
0
 
1− GN

1− GN−2
N

d t +
N−4∑
r=0
3r + 2
2(N − 1)
 
cr+2 − cr+1
−
− V1 + V2
2
=: AN + CN (5.9)
While it is not easy to determine the sign of this expression for an arbitrarily finite N ,
it is possible to do this for N sufficiently large. Like in previous the sections we assume
that there is a fixed C 2[0,1]-function, V (x), such that V (0) = 0 and Vk := V (k/N).
Beginning with AN , by Proposition 4.2 and the monotone convergence theorem we get
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that
lim
N→∞
AN = V (1)−
V ′(1)
2
+
∫ 1
0
x2
2
V ′′(x)d x −
∫ V (1)
0

1− V−1

x
V (1)

d x .
By partial integration twice in the first integral above, and observing that∫ V (1)
0
V−1

x
V (1)

d x = V (1)−
∫ 1
0
V (x)d x ,
one readily finds that limN→∞ AN = 0, independently of the sign of V
′′(x). It is easy
to see that limN→∞ CN = 0 so that ∆
δ0∞ = 0. Thus, at infinity the expected payoffs are
equal which is natural since the fraction of δ0-players then will be zero. What is more
interesting, however, is to consider the rates of convergence in the three terms above.
Let us consider prize functions of the type V (x) = xα, α ∈ R+. A careful investigation
of each of the terms in AN shows that both the sum and the integral converge like
O (1/N). Hence AN converges to zero like O (1/N). A proof of this claim is given in
Appendix B. Now, what is interesting is that the special form of V (x) makes CN tends
to zero like O (1/Nα), i.e. slower than AN . Thus we conclude that ∆δ0∞ tends to zero
and that ∆
δ0
N < 0 for all N large enough. We formulate this result in a theorem:
Theorem 5.5. Let 0 < α < 1 and consider an N-player static war of attrition with prize
sequence {Vk}Nk=1, where Vk := (k/N)α. Then there exist an N ∗ ∈ N such that for all
N ≥ N ∗ the strategy of choosing waiting time according to the cdf GN (t), solving 4.2, is
not an ESS and the game therefore lacks ESS strategies if the number of players exceed
N ∗.
Below we have included some numerical results illustrating Theorem 5.5. By [9] we
note that ∆
δ0
N > 0 for all N ≥ 3 in the special case when α = 1. It is therefore possible
to push the number N ∗ towards infinity by choosing an ǫ > 0 small enough and con-
sider α= 1− ǫ.
It is interesting to note that even though the time evolution of the dynamic and the
static model behave the same when N is large, and that Theorem 3.6 indicates that the
dynamic model in a sense is static in the limit, the features of the optimal strategies
differ a lot between the models. In the dynamic model the unique ESS of playing the
exponential distribution with mean (N − k)(Vk+1 − Vk) in round k tends to the "quasi
static" strategy of playing q˙(t) = d/d t(V−1(t/V (1))). For the static model the same
result holds true by Proposition 4.2, but if V (x) is concave the limit is being reached
from a sequence of non-ESS’s. Thus the fundamental difference between the N -player
dynamic model, being a repetitive game, and the N -player static model, being a one-
shot game, is resolved only at N =∞.
For prize sequences extracted from increasing prize functions that are neither con-
vex nor concave no definite results have been found in the N -player case. However,
like in the concave case the calculation in (5.3) strongly indicate that a static WA with
such a prize sequence lacks an ESS if N is large enough.
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FIGURE 3. Numerical results for the value of ∆
δ0
N in the range N =
4, ..., 35 where the prize sequence was recovered from the function
V (x) = xα. The green curves, starting from below, correspond to
α = 0.5,0.6,0.7,0.8,0.9, the red curve has α = 1, and the black
curves has α = 1.1,1.2,1.3,1.4,1.5.
APPENDIX A. FINDING THE MATRIX P(t)
In this appendix we consider the problem of finding the matrix P(t) from Section 3,
equation (3.5), in the main article. For this we consider the matrix of intensities
Q :=

−λ1 λ1 0 · · · · · · 0
0 −λ2 λ2 0 · · · 0
...
...
...
. . .
. . .
...
0 0 0 · · · −λN−1 λN−1
0 0 0 0 · · · 0

where λk ∈ R+ for all k = 1, ...,N − 1. The matrix P(t) relates to Q via the Chapman-
Kolomogorov equation ¨
dP
dt
(t) = Q · P(t), t ≥ 0
P(0) = I .
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Because of the simple bidiagonal structure of Q it is easy to check that the eigenvalues
Λk
	N
k=1 are given by Λk = −λk. Let vk ∈ RN be the right eigenvector corresponding
to Λk and let V :=

v1,v2, ...,vk

. Then, investigating the eigenvector equations one
by one yields
V =

1
λ1
λ1−λ2
λ1λ2
(λ1−λ3)(λ2−λ3)
· · ·
∏N−1
k=1 λk∏N−1
k=1 (λk−λN )
0 1
λ2
λ2−λ3
· · ·
∏N−1
k=2 λk∏N−1
k=2 (λk−λN )
0 0 1 · · ·
∏N−1
k=3 λk∏N−1
k=3 (λk−λN )
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 · · · 1

,
which is an invertible N × N -matrix with inverse
V−1 =

1 − λ1
λ1−λ2
λ1λ2
(λ1−λ2)(λ1−λ3)
· · · (−1)N+1
∏N−1
k=1 λk∏N−1
k=1 (λ1−λk+1)
0 1 − λ2
λ2−λ3
· · · (−1)N+2
∏N−1
k=2 λk∏N−1
k=2 (λ2−λk+1)
0 0 1 · · · (−1)N+3
∏N−1
k=3 λk∏N−1
k=3 (λ3−λk+1)
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 · · · 1

.
Thus V−1 ·Q ·V = D, where D is the diagonal matrix with the eigenvalues Λk	Nk=1 on
the diagonal. Defining A(t) := V−1 · P(t) we get the new problem¨
dA
dt
(t) = D ·A(t), t ≥ 0
A(0) = V−1,
where D ∈ RN×N is the diagonal matrix with the eigenvalues Λk	Nk=1 on the diagonal.
By elementary calculus one finds that A(t) =

ai je
−λi t

and by the initial condition we
get that
ai j =



(−1)i+ j
∏ j−1
k=i λk∏ j
k=i+1(λi−λk)
, i < j
1, i = j
0, i > j
and since P(t) = V ·A(t) we end up with an explicit expression for P(t).
APPENDIX B. ASYMPTOTICS OF AN
In this appendix we prove the claim that the terms in AN in (5.9) both converge like
O (1/N). Let the underlying prize function be on the form V (x) = xα, 0 < α < 1, so
that Vk := V (k/N). For AN we have
AN =VN −
N − 2
2
 
VN − VN−1

+
N−4∑
r=0
(r + 1)(r + 2)
2(N − 1)
 
cr+2 − cr+1
−
−
∫ ∞
0
 
1− GN

1− GN−2
N

d t,
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where VN = V (1) by definition. For the second term, by the mean value theorem and
a Taylor approximation, we have
(VN − VN−1)(N − 2) = V ′(1) + C1/N
where C1 is a constant depending on N such that |C1| ≤ supx∈[ 1
2
,1] |V ′′(x)|/2. For the
sum in AN we have that
N−4∑
r=0
(r + 1)(r + 2)
2(N − 1)
 
cr+2 − cr+1

=
N−3∑
r=1
ar
 
cr+1 − cr

(B.1)
and since
aN−3cN−2 − a0c1 =
N−3∑
r=1
ar(cr+1 − cr) +
N−3∑
r=1
(ar − ar−1)cr (B.2)
we get the relation
N−4∑
r=0
(r + 1)(r + 2)
2(N − 1)
 
cr+2 − cr+1

=
(N − 3)(N − 2)
2(N − 1) cN−2 −
N−3∑
r=1
r
N − 1 cr . (B.3)
The first term in the equality above can be written like V ′(1)/2 + C2/N where the
constant C2 = supx∈((N−1)/N ,1) |V ′′(x)|. For the sum in the right hand side of (B.3) it
holds that
N−3∑
r=1
(ar − ar−1)cr =
N − 3
N − 1V

N − 1
N

−
N−3∑
r=1
1
N − 1V

r + 1
N

where we have used the same trick as in (B.2). Thus, collecting all the terms we get
the following estimate for the sum in AN
N−4∑
r=0
(r + 1)(r + 2)
2(N − 1)
 
cr+2 − cr+1

=
V ′(1)
2
− V (1) +
N−3∑
r=1
1
N − 1V

r + 1
N

+
C3
N
≤ V
′(1)
2
− V (1) +
∫ 1
0
V (x)d x +
C3
N
. (B.4)
where C3 is uniformly bounded over N and the last inequality follows by the concavity
of V (x). For the convergence of the integral term in AN we recall the following theorem
(see e.g. [15]):
Theorem B.1. If f (x) is a convex function on [0,1], then
n∑
r=0
f

r
n

n
r

x r(1− x)n−r ≥ f (x), 0≤ x ≤ 1
for all n≥ 1.
Thus, by Theorem B.1 and the fact that the approximate forward derivative of V (x) is
less than V ′(x) due to convexity, we get the following estimate
dGN
d x
≤ 1
V ′(GN )− D1N
, (B.5)
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for x > 0 and D1 > 0 uniformly bounded in N . Writing (B.5) as a total derivative
less than 1, integrating over [0, x] and using the conditions that GN (0) = 0 and
V (GN (0)) = 0 yields
V (GN (x))≤ x +
D1
N
GN (x)
which in turn means that
GN (x) ≤ V−1

x +
D1
N
GN (x)

= V−1(x) +
GN (x)
V ′(V−1( x˜))
D1
N
≤ V−1(x) + D2
N
for an x˜ ∈ (x ,GN (x)D1/N). Hence, since GN converges to V−1(x) uniformly (due to
[4]) like O (1/N) so does the integral term in AN .
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